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OVERVIEW — This paper seeks to provide the basics for understanding the
current debate over tax credits as a vehicle for reducing the number of unin-
sured Americans and focuses attention on some of the associated issues: How
is health insurance treated under current tax law? Why tax credits and not
deductions? What are the major issues in designing tax credits? Who should
be eligible and for what size credit? What changes, if any, would be needed to
the insurance market to ensure that policies are available and affordable for
people eligible for tax credits? What are the major issues related to administer-
ing a tax credit? Proposals pending in Congress are referenced as illustrations
of the varied way in which tax credits can be designed and implemented.
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Expanding Health Coverage for
the Uninsured: Fundamentals of
the Tax Credit Option
Tax credits to help subsidize the purchase of health insurance have been
proposed in one form or another since at least the early 1970s, when
Reps. Richard Fulton (D-Tenn.) and Joel Broyhill (R-Va.) introduced
Medicredit. Developed by the American Medical Association (AMA),
the legislation was the first of many tax credit bills that were offered as
market-based alternatives to public program expansions, such as those
supported by many in the Democratic party.1
In 1990, Congress enacted a small tax credit as a supplement to the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) for low-income families buying coverage for
their children. Viewed by many as wasteful and unworkable, it was
repealed soon thereafter.2 More broadly targeted tax credits fueled de-
bate but no serious legislative action when, in 1992, President George
Bush proposed a program of refundable tax credits for low- and middle-
income individuals to help them pay for health insurance.3
Once again at the center of the debate about ways to reduce the number
of uninsured Americans, tax credits are included in current congres-
sional bills that reflect a wide range of philosophies about how to ex-
pand health insurance coverage. Most proposals simply use the tax sys-
tem as a convenient way to channel premium subsidies to people who
would otherwise remain uninsured. President George W. Bush has pro-
posed $89 billion over ten years in refundable tax credits to help lower-
income families buy health insurance coverage, primarily in the private
individual health insurance market. Many Democrats in Congress have
supported tax credits to subsidize the purchase of public insurance, such
as Medicaid or the State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP),
or to help pay for continuation health insurance coverage through the
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA)4 or
similar state programs. Some more sweeping proposals, however, would
use tax credits to promote major change in the health system. At least
one proposal would entirely replace the current tax subsidies for em-
ployer-paid health insurance with tax credits for the individual pur-
chase of coverage; the aim would be to reduce or eliminate the role of
employers in the health insurance market.5
Although no action has occurred on the president’s proposal or the more
ambitious tax credit proposals to encourage individual purchase of in-
surance, Congress has passed and the president has signed into law
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H.R. 3009, the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210). This legislation establishes
a new temporary tax credit for the health insurance costs of workers
receiving trade readjustment assistance. A tax credit will also be available
to retirees age 55 or older who receive their pensions from the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation. The tax credits, which will be refundable
and payable at the time coverage is purchased, will equal 65 percent of
the amount paid for COBRA continuation coverage or other forms of
qualified health insurance coverage. Such coverage includes state-based
or state-sponsored plans and, in limited circumstances, coverage sold in
the individual market. State-based coverage must be made available to
qualifying individuals on a guaranteed issue basis without exclusion of
coverage for preexisting conditions. A House provision to phase out the
credit with increased income was eliminated in conference.
Much has been written lately about health insurance tax credits and
specific tax credit proposals,6 and the debate in Congress over health
insurance tax credits for recently unemployed workers was in many
ways a sideshow. Such proposals address only a small share of the unin-
sured population. The greater challenge for lawmakers is presented by
the persistent high rates of uninsured Americans, even at times of eco-
nomic prosperity. In 2000, when the economy was still booming, the
number of uninsured Americans for the full year was almost 39 million
(or nearly 16 percent of the population under age 65).7 Perhaps as many
as 55 million Americans lacked insurance at some time during the year,
as they moved in and out of jobs or public sources of coverage.8 The
return of double-digit annual increases in health insurance premiums
and a slowed economy is likely to produce higher rates of uninsured for
the foreseeable future. The question of whether tax credits or other
forms of tax subsidies can make a significant dent in the number of
uninsured Americans is thus important and timely.
CURRENT TAX TREATMENT OF
HEALTH INSURANCE
Current tax law provides three basic forms of subsidies for health insur-
ance premiums. The following summary is limited to basic health insur-
ance rules and does not include special provisions of the tax code relat-
ing to long-term care insurance or to medical savings accounts.
Treatment of Employer-Paid Benefits
When an employer contributes to a health benefit plan on behalf of em-
ployees and their dependents, the costs are a deductible business ex-
pense for the employer, and the value of the benefits is excluded from
the employees’ taxable income—for the purposes of calculating both
income tax and Social Security and Medicare payroll taxes. Any amounts
that employees must contribute toward premiums for themselves and
their families are generally not excluded from taxable income and are
The question of wheth-
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not deductible except under the medical expense deduction (see be-
low). However, an employer’s benefit plan may give an employee the
option of designating a sum to be deducted from his or her wages and
deposited into a “flexible spending account”; the amount deposited is
nontaxable. The employee may draw on the account to pay coinsurance
or deductible requirements under the health plan or to pay for medical
services, such as dental care or eyeglasses, not covered under the plan.9
In June 2002, the Internal Revenue Service announced rules for a new
type of tax-excluded benefit plan, a “health reimbursement arrange-
ment” (HRA). Under an HRA, the employer provides a fixed amount of
money that may be used by the employee to pay medical expenses or
health insurance premiums. An HRA differs from a flexible spending
account in two key ways. First, the HRA is funded entirely with direct
employer dollars, rather than through a wage reduction. Second, amounts
not spent in one year can be carried over into the next.
Deduction for the Self-Employed
The self-employed may deduct from their taxable income a percentage
of the amount they pay for health insurance coverage for themselves
and their families. This deduction is limited to the lesser of (a) net profit
or earnings from self-employment, not counting certain other deduc-
tions, and (b) 60 percent of the premium cost through 2001 and 70 per-
cent in 2002; 100 percent of the cost will be deductible in 2003 and later
years. The deduction is not available to a self-employed person who is
eligible for coverage under another subsidized employer plan, either
directly or through a spouse. The deduction for the self-employed is
“above the line,” that is, it may be subtracted from taxable income
whether the taxpayer itemizes other deductions or takes the standard
deduction. Unlike the employer exclusion, this deduction does not af-
fect Social Security and Medicare tax liability.
Itemized Deduction for Medical and Dental Expenses
A taxpayer who itemizes deductions may deduct most unreimbursed
medical and dental bills for the taxpayer and dependents, including any
insurance premiums, but only to the extent that the costs exceed 7.5
percent of adjusted gross income (AGI).10 If a taxpayer had an AGI of
$50,000 and medical expenses of $5,000, the taxpayer could deduct $1,250
($5,000 minus 7.5 percent of $50,000). Premiums may be included only
when paid by the taxpayer; thus the employee share of group health
premiums can be deducted, but not the amount contributed by the em-
ployer. Because the medical expense deduction is itemized, it is benefi-
cial to the taxpayer only if the sum of it plus other itemized deductions
(such as mortgage interest and state and local taxes) is greater than the
standard deduction. Relatively few low-income people have other de-
ductions sufficient to meet this test. On the other hand, low-income
In June 2002, the IRS
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people who do itemize are much more likely than higher-income
itemizers to take the medical expense deduction, because a smaller ex-
penditure is needed to meet the 7.5 percent-of-AGI test.11
The three basic tax preferences for health insurance and health care are
projected to cost the treasury $630 billion during fiscal years 2003 through
2007. Of this amount, $581 billion—or 92 percent—will go for the em-
ployer exclusion, $18 billion for the self-employed deduction, and $31
billion for the medical expense deduction.12
DESIGN OF A TAX SUBSIDY
FOR INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE
Over the years, there have been many proposals to provide new tax
subsidies to encourage individuals to buy health insurance or to pro-
mote offers of health insurance by small employers who currently do
not provide health coverage. This paper focuses on measures targeted
at individuals because these are currently receiving the most attention
from policymakers. However, proposals to aid employers continue to
be discussed. (Recent examples include a joint proposal by the Health
Insurance Association of America and Families USA and an employer
tax credit included in President Clinton’s last budget proposal.)13
In considering tax subsidies for individual coverage, policymakers must
address several basic design questions:
■ What form should the tax subsidy take: a deduction, a credit, a
refundable credit?
■ Who should be eligible for the subsidy—all taxpayers or a defined
target population?
■ How large should the maximum subsidy be, and should there be
any adjustments for factors such as geography or age?
■ Should the subsidy be available for any kind of health insurance, or
should there be some minimum standards for insurance plans?
Form of the Tax Preference
A new tax preference for individual coverage could take several basic
forms:
■ Itemized deduction — Taxpayers could be allowed to deduct all of
their unreimbursed expenses for insurance premiums, instead of just
the part of their expenses exceeding 7.5 percent of AGI.14 The deduc-
tion would benefit only taxpayers whose total itemized deductions
(including the health insurance deduction) were greater than the
standard deduction. The value of the deduction would depend on the
individual’s marginal tax bracket. For each dollar spent on health
insurance, a taxpayer might receive a subsidy ranging from 10 cents to
38.6 cents (at 2002 rates).
The three basic tax pref-
erences for health insur-
ance and health care are
projected to cost the
treasury $630 billion
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■ Above-the-line deduction — Taxpayers could deduct insurance
premiums, whether or not they itemized other deductions. This
would reduce taxable income and would again be more valuable to
those with income in the higher tax brackets. There would be no
benefit to a taxpayer if exemptions and other deductions had already
reduced taxable income to zero.
■ Nonrefundable credit — A credit for health insurance would reduce
the actual amount of tax paid, rather than taxable income. It thus
would provide a dollar of subsidy for each dollar spent. However, a
“nonrefundable” credit could not exceed total income tax liability; the
maximum credit would thus be available only to taxpayers with a tax
bill above the maximum.
■ Refundable credit — A refundable credit could exceed tax liability,
with the excess refundable to the taxpayer. The full credit amount
would thus be available to low-income families, who often have no
tax liability or are actually owed money by the federal government as
a result of the earned income credit. A refundable credit proposal
could also provide for advance payment. That is, a participant could
receive the credit over the course of the year, instead of waiting for
tax filing time. Some proposals would make advance payments di-
rectly to insurers instead of to the taxpayer. These options are consid-
ered below in the section on administration.
While legislative proposals embodying each of these approaches have
been offered in recent years, policy interest has focused on a refundable
tax credit because it would provide the most help to people who are
least able to afford coverage on their own.
Target Population
Income — Refundable credit proposals typically would provide a fixed
maximum credit to individuals and families with incomes below a speci-
fied threshold and would gradually phase down the credit amount for
higher-income families, with the credit reaching zero at some income level.
For example, the president’s proposal would extend a maximum credit of
$1,000 to a single adult with income of $15,000 or less; the maximum
drops to $556 for someone whose income is $20,000, and no credit is
available when income is $30,000 or more. A gradual phase-out of the
credit amount prevents a “cliff” effect. (If a credit went from $1,000 at
$15,000 annual income to zero at $15,001 income, someone making $15,000
a year would have a strong disincentive to earn another dollar.)
Income limits obviously narrow the population that would be reached
by a tax credit. Figure 1 shows the population without health insurance
in 2000 by family income as a percent of the federal poverty level. (The
poverty income guideline for 2002 is $8,860 for a single person and $18,100
for a family of four.) While many uninsured people have very low in-
comes, more than one in four, or over 10 million, uninsured people are
in families with incomes of 300 percent of poverty or higher.
Of the tax-based ap-
proaches, policy inter-
est has focused on a
refundable tax credit
because it would pro-
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7NHPF Background Paper August 28, 2002
There are several reasons for an income-based phase-out. First, of course,
it limits the potential cost of the proposal. Second, it limits the extent to
which the credits might induce people to drop employer coverage, be-
cause the higher-income people most likely to have access to employer
plans are excluded. If there is a limit to the amount of revenue reduction
policymakers are willing to commit, the phase-out assures that the as-
sistance is targeted to those most in need.
Income limits entail some assumption, necessarily arbitrary, about the
point in the income scale at which people can afford health insurance
without a subsidy. Figure 2 shows, by family income as a percent of
poverty, the likelihood that people who do not have either employer-
based or public coverage will obtain nongroup coverage rather than go
uninsured. The highest-income people are about twice as likely as the
lowest-income people to buy individual coverage. Still, three out of five
people who have no other source of coverage and have incomes greater
than 400 percent of poverty fail to get insurance.
Current Coverage or Access to Coverage — Proposals differ widely in
their treatment of people who currently have insurance or who are eli-
gible for insurance. Nearly all proposals exclude Medicare beneficia-
ries, meaning that a credit could not be used to purchase a Medicare
supplemental policy. Some would exclude people who were eligible
for Medicaid or SCHIP. The aim presumably is to prevent states from
More than one in four,
or over 10 million, un-
insured people are in
families with incomes
of 300 percent of pov-
erty or higher.
FIGURE 1
Proportion of Uninsured People
with Various Levels of Family Income,*
2000
*Family income expressed as a percent of the federal poverty level.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 2001 Supplement.
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shifting recipients from these programs, which are partially state-funded,
to private coverage funded entirely through a federal tax subsidy. It is
not clear how such a requirement could be enforced; would people have
to apply for Medicaid or SCHIP and be rejected before they could ob-
tain the credit?
Treatment of employer coverage is a key issue in the design of a credit
proposal. Some proposals would allow a credit only for people who
were not offered coverage through their own employment or that of a
family member. The goal is to prevent shifts from employer coverage to
credit-subsidized nongroup coverage. Other proposals would allow such
shifts, but would not permit people remaining in group coverage to use
the credit for required employee contributions toward premiums; still
other proposals would permit the credit to be used for this purpose.
The rationale for these different approaches is discussed below in the
section on substitution.
Finally, some proposals would allow the credit only for people who had
been without any insurance for some period before applying. In the
absence of this provision, much of the tax expenditure for a new credit
might go to people who are already buying nongroup coverage. While
denying a credit to these people might reduce costs and would seem to
improve targeting, it also raises equity questions. Why should someone
who has not previously bought insurance receive a subsidy, while some-
one else at the same income level who has been paying for coverage all
along does not? Enforcement might also be difficult; it is hard to see
how the Internal Revenue Service would establish who did and did not
have prior coverage without some form of universal reporting system.
FIGURE 2
Proportion of People in Various Income Groups*
Who Had No Employer or Public Health Insurance Coverage
but Purchased Nongroup Coverage, 2000
*Expressed as family income as a percent of poverty.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, March 2001 Supplement.
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Amount of the Credit
Most proposals provide a credit that would be the lesser of actual pre-
miums paid or some fixed dollar limit. Some proposals also specify that
the credit cannot exceed a fixed percentage of the premium—for ex-
ample, 90 percent—meaning that all participants, even those with very
low incomes, would have to contribute something toward premiums.
For the sake of simplicity, the following discussion focuses on the fixed
dollar credits that are most commonly suggested. How big should a
credit be? Should it be adjusted for age, geography, or other factors
commonly used by insurers in setting premiums?
Maximum Credit Amount — Current proposals offer very different
maximum credit amounts. Fixing the credit amount necessarily involves
some balancing between the policy goal of helping people obtain cover-
age and competing budgetary priorities. Assuming that resources for a
tax subsidy are not unlimited, how big must the subsidy be to have a
meaningful effect on the uninsured population? There is considerable
disagreement surrounding several key questions:
■ How much are people willing or able to pay?
■ How much does health insurance cost?
■ Why are participation rates important?
How much are people willing or able to pay? If a credit is not large
enough to pay the entire cost of health insurance, not everyone who is
eligible will actually obtain coverage. Any credit will lower the effective
price of coverage and induce at least some uninsured people to partici-
pate. But there is considerable uncertainty about just how much the
price must be lowered to encourage large numbers of modest-income
people to buy insurance.
Economists have developed a variety of models for estimating the effects
of tax credit proposals, all involving some estimate of “elasticity” of de-
mand—that is, the relationship between cost and the likelihood that people
will buy coverage.15 There has also been what amounts to a set of natural
experiments, in the form of public insurance programs that require an
income-based premium contribution. Ku and Coughlin, examining four
of these programs, found that participation rates drop rapidly when pre-
miums rise as a percent of income (Table 1).16 This effect is probably not
uniform. Higher-income people are willing or able to contribute a higher
share of income, and older or sicker people are likely to be willing to
spend more than young and healthy ones. Moreover, there are factors
other than premium rates that may have affected participation in these
programs, such as burdensome application procedures or the perceived
“welfare stigma” that may be associated with some public programs.
The following hypothetical assumptions, based on the Ku and Coughlin
findings, illustrate the importance of having some idea of what insur-
ance costs when assessing whether a given credit will attract many
Premium
as % of
Income
1%
3%
5%
Estimated
Participation
Rate
57%
35%
18%
TABLE 1
An Illustration:
Participation in State
Insurance Programs,
by Premium
as a Percent of Income
Based on Ku and Coughlin, “Use of Sliding
Scale Premiums in Subsidized Insurance
Programs.”
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participants: To achieve 57 percent participation among individuals mak-
ing $15,000 a year, the amount they would have to pay for coverage
after a tax credit could be no more than $150 a year. If the available
credit were $1,000, this level of participation would be achieved only if
people could find insurance for $1,150 or less. If, on the other hand,
most people could only find insurance that cost $1,750 or more, then
post-credit premiums would rise to 5 percent of income, and participa-
tion would be expected to drop to 18 percent. To keep participation at
57 percent, the credit would have to rise to $1,600.
How much does health insurance cost? There has been a heated debate
in recent months about what kind of coverage people can actually buy
at what premium rate. Some studies contend that most people could get
“good” coverage for $1,000, while others point out that, even leaving
aside the higher prices paid by older people or those in high-cost areas,
a $1,000 a year premium would usually buy a policy considerably less
comprehensive than those common in employment-based plans.17 (The
effects of age and geography on premiums are discussed below.)
Obviously, people will differ about how much coverage is “good” enough,
and opinions may reflect differing views of why uninsurance is a problem
and what kind of insurance is appropriate. If the aim is to protect families
from catastrophic losses in the event of a serious illness, a low-cost policy
with a high deductible might do the job. If the aim is to promote early
entry into primary and preventive care, something closer to first-dollar
coverage is needed, entailing much higher premiums. Assuming that avail-
able resources are limited, a credit that will provide at least some basic
coverage is obviously better than no credit at all. However, if people are
going to have to contribute something towards their premiums, partici-
pation levels are likely to drop if the available products do not appear
valuable to potential purchasers. Past attempts at the state level to offer
low-priced “bare bones” coverage did not attract many buyers.
Why are participation rates important? If a tax credit significantly low-
ers the cost of coverage, making it affordable for people of modest
means, why should policymakers care if people take advantage of it or
prefer to spend their money on something else? One major reason is
that, if participation is low, the people using the credit are likely to be
those in the poorest health. As will be discussed below, this can affect
efforts to improve the functioning of the individual health insurance
market. In addition, most proposals would make the credit available to
people who are already buying individual health insurance. These people
will presumably wish to claim the credit no matter how small it is. If it is
too small to induce many additional uninsured people to seek coverage,
the bulk of the new tax expenditure would go to subsidize people who
are already insured. This might be defensible on equity grounds but
might not be an efficient use of federal resources to address the prob-
lem of the uninsured.
Past attempts at the
state level to offer low-
priced “bare bones”
coverage did not at-
tract many buyers.
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While the net cost of coverage is a key factor in participation, it is not
the only factor; ease of obtaining coverage is also important. Most
people eligible for employer group coverage participate, not just be-
cause the employer pays part of the premium, but also because sign-up
is easy, the worker does not have to shop for a policy, and required
employee contributions are automatically deducted from paychecks.
Attaining similar levels of participation in an individual tax credit may
depend in part on how the credit is administered. Administrative op-
tions are considered later in this report.
Geographic Adjustment — Health insurance premiums are much higher
in some geographic areas than in others. The Council of Economic Ad-
visers found that premiums for a family of four ranged from $1,272 in
Bloomington, Illinois, to $9,675 in Boston, while a recent study for the
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation found that nongroup premiums for
single buyers in Miami were twice as high as in some other areas.18
Clearly, this means that a fixed credit will cover a higher share of the
premium, or will buy richer benefits, in some places than it will in oth-
ers. It would theoretically be possible to more nearly equalize the buy-
ing power of the credit through some form of geographic adjustment.
Establishing a local index value would be controversial—geographic ad-
justment factors under Medicare have been a source of debate for years—
and administration might be cumbersome. (Constitutional issues may
also arise.) Moreover, although general cost of living varies geographi-
cally, there is no adjustment in other elements of the tax code, such as
brackets, exemptions, or the standard deduction. It might be appropri-
ate to treat health insurance differently if variation in health insurance
premiums is much greater than variation in general cost of living. Al-
though there is no one agreed index of local cost of living, various pri-
vately developed measures show differences in the range of 2.5:1. This
is greater than the premium difference observed in the Kaiser study, but
much less than that found by the Council of Economic Advisors.
Age Adjustment — Except in the handful of states that have adopted
community rating,19 insurers in the individual market charge older buy-
ers much more than younger ones. The Council of Economic Advisers
reports that the median premium for a 55 year-old male is $2,464, while it
is $772 for a 25 year-old male buying comparable benefits. A fixed-dollar
credit would leave the older buyer paying a much higher share of income
towards premiums than a younger buyer with the same income. One
possible solution would be to adjust the credit amount by age. This op-
tion, and its possible effect on the market, is considered below.
Qualified Coverage
As defined under current tax law, health insurance includes any policy
that pays for medical expenses. (This definition excludes so-called “dread
disease” policies, which make payments if a policyholder develops a
Insurers in the individual
market often charge
older buyers much more
than younger ones.
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given problem, such as cancer, whether or not the policyholder incurs
any medical bills.) Most credit proposals would allow the credit to be
used for any kind of health insurance meeting the very broad current
definition. However, there may be concerns that some people would
buy substandard coverage; this was one of the reported problems with
the child health insurance tax credit in the early 1990s. A credit proposal
could define some minimum standards for health insurance benefits.
Setting a minimum benefit package would probably be controversial,
and there might need to be some system for certifying that available
health insurance plans met the standards. Many proponents of the tax
credit approach would contend that benefits should be determined by
individual preferences, not regulation. An alternative view is that the
government has an interest in assuring that a new tax expenditure be
used for coverage that meets the intended purpose.
MAKING INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE AVAILABLE
The Individual Insurance Market
About 12.6 million people under the age of 65 bought health insurance
directly in 2000,20 without the benefit of purchasing through an employer
group. Individual coverage is sold by commercial carriers, the Blues
(Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans), and managed care organizations. A
much smaller number of individuals buy coverage through professional
associations, fraternal organizations, and similar entities.21
As is the case for group health insurance, individual insurance is de-
signed to protect policyholders from unexpected (unpredictable) medi-
cal expenses. The costs of insuring higher users of insured medical ser-
vices are pooled with the costs of below-average users of services. In
large employer groups, costs can be averaged out across a large number
of people. As the group gets smaller, however, the ability to offset above-
average costs with below-average costs gets more difficult. In the indi-
vidual market, no natural group exists across which to spread risks,
although, for purposes of designing and rating policies, an insurer will
generally consider its individual policyholders as one risk pool. There
also is an added concern. Whereas, in the employer group market, people
associate with the group for purposes other than to buy insurance, in the
individual market, persons who are seeking coverage are there solely for
the purpose of buying insurance and thus present a higher risk to insure
than persons obtaining coverage through an employer group plan. This is
because younger and healthier individuals typically decline to purchase
health insurance until they anticipate significant medical expenses.
In addition, it is more costly to market, underwrite, enroll, and adminis-
ter individual insurance policies than group policies. This is reflected in
the higher “administrative load” that goes into the nongroup premium.
Most credit proposals
would allow the credit
to be used for any kind
of health insurance
meeting the very broad
current definition.
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Although estimates vary, roughly 35 cents of every pre-
mium dollar for individual coverage goes for adminis-
tration and profit; 65 cents goes to pay claims costs.
(For very large group policies, the average paid for ad-
ministration and profit may range from 5 percent to 15
percent.).22
The other key difference between group and nongroup
insurance is that, in employer groups, low-risk people
who might otherwise not be interested in insurance will
enroll because of the employer subsidy, ease of enroll-
ment, and so on. This is what makes pooling work. The
idea behind the tax credit is that if low-risk people got
sufficient subsidy to induce them to enroll in the indi-
vidual market, pooling would be possible there as well.
The regulation of health insurance sold by insurers was
for a long time the sole responsibility of the states, and,
with the exception of requirements under the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
remains so today (see box). States require insurers in
the individual market to comply with requirements re-
lating to financial standards, policy forms (what can and
cannot be in the contract offered to purchasers), access
to coverage and required benefits, the rating of premi-
ums, market conduct, and renewability of coverage.
Insurers selling in the individual market are generally
permitted by state regulators to manage the risk of their
business by restricting access to their policies and pric-
ing their policies on the basis of the expected costs of
insuring the policyholder. For persons who are not HIPAA-eligible and
with the exception of a few states where regulations are more protec-
tive for policyholders, an insurer may accept, reject, or accept with con-
ditions any applicant for an individual policy. Most states permit indi-
vidual insurers to evaluate and classify applicants for acceptance or re-
jection on the basis of “risk factors,” such as their state of health, medi-
cal history, age, gender, habits (for example, whether they smoke), ge-
ography, and other insurance that the person may have. Also, with the
exception of a few states, insurers are permitted to vary the premiums
of policies offered to individuals who are accepted for coverage on the
basis of their expected risk of incurring health expenditures.
Thus, a young person with no existing or prior medical conditions will
generally be classified as a good risk and accepted for coverage at the
insurer’s average (standard) premium for individual policies. An ap-
plicant who has a current or preexisting medical condition is likely to
be classified as high-risk. The insurer may reject the applicant entirely
or accept the applicant at an above-average (substandard) rate. If the
HIPAA
Under HIPAA, states must establish a means by
which individuals moving from group to indi-
vidual coverage and who meet certain require-
ments can buy coverage without preexisting-
condition limitations. Such individuals are
known as "HIPAA-eligibles." In some states, all
insurers participating in the individual market
or one designated insurer must provide coverage
to HIPAA eligibles on a guaranteed-issue basis.
Other states have designed their high-risk pools
to meet the guaranteed-issue requirement. HIPAA
also requires that all coverage in the individual
market be guaranteed-renewable. HIPAA does
not, however, impose any rating requirements on
health insurance policies, either in the group or
individual health insurance markets.
HIPAA has made it easier for people transitioning
out of employer-sponsored health insurance to
find a source of coverage. It has not, however,
made health insurance less costly. Some evidence
suggests that HIPAA has, in fact, contributed to
premium increases in the individual market. This
is because of the overall higher risk of those indi-
viduals electing coverage under HIPPA-eligible
policies.
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applicant is accepted, the insurer may impose a temporary or perma-
nent exclusion of coverage for the preexisting medical condition. People
with chronic conditions are especially vulnerable to being denied cover-
age or to being accepted with preexisting condition limitations or exclu-
sions and at higher premiums.23
Age is itself an important risk factor. Insurers will generally price the
policy of a healthy person over age 50 at least twice the premium of a
person who is less than 50. Often the difference between a 25-year-old
and a 55-year-old can be four-fold. Geography is also highly predictive.
Premiums tend to be higher in urban areas than in rural areas and are
also higher in areas with higher utilization of health care services.
Insurers also manage their risks and the cost of their policies through
benefit design. Higher enrollee cost-sharing is used to keep premiums
low enough to attract average-risk individuals. Cost-sharing features,
such as deductibles, copayments, coinsurance, and benefit limits are
generally less generous than in the group marketplace. Benefit value is
also lower. Many individual policies have limited or no mental health,
maternity, or prescription drug coverage because these benefits are known
to attract above-average-cost enrollees.
Some states impose strict limits on the selection (underwriting) and pric-
ing (rating) practices used by individual insurers. New York and New
Jersey, for example, require that insurers participating in the individual
market accept all applicants (guaranteed issue), and use pure or modi-
fied community rating to derive their premiums.24 Although some carri-
ers have left these markets, individuals are able to choose nongroup
policies from a number of carriers. Young people may be paying more
than they would have absent the reforms, but older and sicker people
are able to obtain insurance that is both available without limitation and
less costly than it would have been. In some states, however, such as
Kentucky, New Hampshire,25 and Washington, reforms led to signifi-
cant market disruptions because many insurers elected to exit those states
rather than conduct business under what they perceived as adverse
business conditions. Moreover, insurance coverage rates generally did
not improve, although it is dangerous to assert cause and effect given
the confounding role played by state labor markets, consolidation in
the insurance industry, and other factors.26
Options for Individual Insurance Market Reforms
If refundable tax credits were made available to people buying individual
insurance, insurers might voluntarily take steps to make their products
available and attractively priced to those individuals. It is also possible,
however, that people who would benefit from tax credits might find few
or no insurance options in their area. To ensure that this does not happen,
lawmakers could require insurers to make some or all of their insurance
policies available to tax-credit-eligible individuals at community-rated
Higher enrollee cost-
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premiums. Such requirements could be imposed on a state-by-state basis
or through federal law and regulation.
State regulations reflect local conditions and may thus best fit the unique
circumstances of local insurance markets. Also, as incubators of policy
innovations, states could learn from one another about the best ap-
proaches for achieving expanded coverage. However, regulation on a
state-by-state basis may not be the most effective way to improve avail-
ability and affordability of coverage. Insurers that do not like the rules
of the game in one state can shop for more compatible regulatory envi-
ronments elsewhere. This has been the experience in some states that
imposed community rating or tight rating bands27 and guaranteed issue
on insurers selling in the individual market. Moreover, state-based regu-
lations may create disparities across geographic borders, making it dif-
ficult for individuals to obtain seamless coverage if they move from one
state to another. Such state law variations could also complicate opera-
tions for insurers that sell in more than one state, although many such
insurers have traditionally preferred state-level over federal regulation,
perhaps because they have grown accustomed to it.
Alternatively, federal standards could be established for health insurers
wishing to sell to tax credit recipients. These might be established as
minimum or “floor” standards, allowing states to provide for standards
that are more protective for consumers, or they might be established as
uniform national standards with no state variation permitted. The first
approach often has political appeal because it gives states flexibility to
go beyond federal requirements. The second approach, in which state
laws are preempted (overridden) by federal law, achieves regulatory
uniformity for insurers and greater simplicity for consumers. Insurers
must play under the same rules, regardless of where they are located.
Regulating Underwriting — To assure that one or more policies offer-
ing adequate coverage is available to tax-credit-eligible individuals, law-
makers may want to establish certain underwriting rules. Three areas
of underwriting are especially important in this regard: the initial issu-
ance of insurance, rules relating to the temporary or permanent exclu-
sion from coverage of preexisting medical conditions, and renewability
of coverage.
Guaranteed issue. To assure that a tax-credit-eligible person is able to
obtain an individual policy, insurers could be required to write individual
coverage on a guaranteed issue basis, meaning, that the insurer must
accept all applicants regardless of their risk factors. Exceptions may be
allowed for health plans, such as managed care plans that lack the
capacity to accept additional applicants, so long as any enrollment lim-
its were not discriminatory.
Preexisting condition limitations and exclusions. Restrictions may be
placed on insurers' ability to impose limits or exclusions for preexist-
ing medical conditions. Recognizing the need to prevent insurers from
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having to write policies for people who wait until they are injured or
get sick to buy insurance, most proposals allow insurers to impose some
period of preexisting condition exclusion (six months or one year) on an
individual lacking immediate prior insurance coverage. Under HIPAA,
for example, an individual is eligible for coverage without any preexist-
ing condition limitations or exclusions only if he or she had prior con-
tinuous coverage without a gap of more than 63 days.
Renewability. This requirement assures that, once a person is accepted
for coverage by an individual carrier, that coverage will not be termi-
nated unless the person commits fraud or fails to pay his or her premium.
Otherwise, the insurer must permit the enrollee to renew the policy re-
gardless of that person’s claims history. Guaranteed renewability of indi-
vidual insurance products is already required by HIPAA, the only federal
requirement that applies to all individual health insurance policies.
Regulating Premium Rates — Regulation of rating practices as they
apply to the individual market has been considered over the years, but
usually only as part of broader health insurance reform proposals. In
1996, when Congress debated the legislation that eventually became
HIPAA, regulation of rating was considered too controversial. Con-
gress left the regulation of rates to the states. In subsequent congres-
sional sessions, only a small handful of proposals tackled this subject.
Today, few if any proposals seek to regulate rating practices of insurers.
In past legislation, insurers would have been permitted to base their
rates on risk factors that are not directly health-related, such as geogra-
phy, age, and sometimes gender. Some proposals would have imposed
no restrictions on the use of such factors, while others would have lim-
ited the range of possible variations. A few proposals would have re-
quired pure community rating.
Rating regulation alone would not in theory affect the average premium
rates charged by insurers. Instead, it would restrict the extent to which
the rate charged to any particular individual could vary from the aver-
age. Typically, the oldest and sickest enrollees pay several times as much
as younger and healthier enrollees for the same coverage. By limiting
such variation, regulation reduces rates for the high-cost enrollees and
raises rates for the low-cost ones. When rating reform is coupled with
underwriting reforms that bring older and sicker enrollees into the pool,
the overall cost of the pool rises, as does the average premium. The
challenge is to prevent the resulting premiums from climbing so high
for the enrollees who had previously been paying relatively low premi-
ums that they drop their policies. A spiraling effect could gradually fore-
close coverage to younger and healthier persons who may also have
relatively low incomes.
It is also the case that high-risk enrollees may not be equally distributed
among insurers. This could happen by chance or because high-risk ap-
plicants may be drawn to certain insurers (for example, PPOs instead of
Today, few if any pro-
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closed-network HMOs) or because some insurers found ways to target
their marketing to low-risk individuals. In the latter case, an insurer’s
success would depend on its ability to select the most favorable risks.
Interplay of Tax Credit Amount and Market Reform — If the premium
for a 55-year-old male is $2,464, compared to $772 for a 25-year-old,
then a $1,000 credit would leave the older buyer with $1,464 in out-of-
pocket cost, while the younger buyer would pay nothing. One way of
addressing this disparity is to regulate insurers’ rate-setting practices to
reduce the difference in premiums for younger and older buyers. An
alternative is to adjust the credit amount for age. For example, if it were
thought that someone making $15,000 could spend $150 for coverage,
the maximum credit might be $622 for a 25-year-old and $2,314 for a 55-
year-old. (A precedent exists in the tax code; the maximum deduction
for long-term care insurance premiums varies by age.) The two ap-
proaches are roughly equivalent in effect; Lynn Etheredge has suggested
that individual states might be allowed to decide whether to regulate
or adjust the credit.28
Probably older people are willing to spend a higher share of income for
health insurance than younger people. Equalizing the price of coverage
for older and younger buyers might mean that a smaller proportion of
younger uninsured people would participate. Whether this is a concern
may depend on what one sees as the primary goal of a tax credit pro-
gram. If the aim is to cover the maximum number of uninsured people
within a given budget, this is likely to be achieved if younger people—
who make up the majority of the uninsured—were given a much stronger
incentive to buy coverage. If the aim is to assure that coverage is afford-
able to those most in need, an age adjustment might be appropriate.
Spreading Risk to Increase Coverage
Options exist to spread the costs of high-risk enrollees more equitably
among insurers, or even to spread those costs among a broader source
of financing, such as taxpayers in general. Mechanisms that rely on sources
of financing that are external to the individual market are likely to be
the most successful in expanding health insurance coverage. If the pool
is financed only within the market, low-risk people have to subsidize
high-risk ones, and their participation drops. Bringing in outside money
holds the average premium down for existing insureds and makes the
coverage more attractive to the uninsured. Two major alternatives are
possible: reinsurance and risk pools.
Reinsurance — Reinsurance is a mechanism by which insurers pay part
of their premiums into a fund and may then be compensated if some of
their enrollees incur especially high costs. Insurers have long purchased
reinsurance voluntarily through private entities. The original insurer
pays the reinsurer part of its premium revenues, and the reinsurer as-
sumes part of the risk, such as all costs for any individual policyholder
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that exceed a given threshold or aggregate costs for all policyholders in
excess of some amount of money. It is important to emphasize that the
costs of caring for those high-cost individuals do not disappear. The
reinsurer charges a premium to the primary insurer based on its assess-
ment of the underlying risk of having to pay claims for those amounts
that are reinsured. However, the reinsurance mechanism could be de-
signed to spread these high-cost cases across a larger pool of insuring
entities, such as all health insurers in a state or all insuring entities,
including self-insured employers. Alternatively, some portion of the costs
could be spread to taxpayers. In this manner, the costs would be exter-
nalized, allowing the primary insurer to lower premiums. One analysis
of a hypothetical reinsurance pool found that reinsuring as little as 1
percent of the highest-cost cases could reduce premium costs by about
14 percent.29 Which risks would be ceded to the reinsurance pool and
who would participate in its financing are just two of the challenging
and politically contentious design issues that would have to be resolved.30
Whatever the design, the success of the reinsurance mechanism in re-
ducing premiums will largely depend on providing financial sources
external to the individual insurance market.
Risk Pools — In risk pool arrangements, high-risk individuals are iden-
tified at the time of enrollment, and the entire excess cost of covering
these individuals is then spread among all the insurers in that segment
of the market. Insurers may decline to cover these applicants and refer
them to a state-established program, or individuals may be able to ap-
ply directly to the risk pool if they meet certain conditions. The risk
pool will then charge these enrollees a premium rate that is higher than
average (often 150 percent of the statewide average) but less than the
actual cost of covering them. Resulting losses are then financed in a
variety of ways, as described below. In “assigned risk programs,” high-
risk applicants are allocated among insurers, each of which must accept
a certain share of applicants. Or such applicants may be assigned to
certain designated carriers with the other (referring) carriers helping to
make up the resulting losses.
In 2001, 29 states operated high-risk pools; New Hampshire recently
passed legislation to create one. A total of about 113,000 people obtained
their health insurance through these pools, with much of the enrollment
in Minnesota (25,892), and California (20,834). In six states, premium
subsidies were available for low-income enrollees. Most states used their
risk pools to comply with the group-to-individual portability provisions
of HIPAA. Enrollment in pools has been and is likely to remain modest
because premiums are high relative to incomes and enrollees are ex-
pected to shoulder significant cost-sharing through deductibles and
copayments. Most pools impose preexisting condition exclusions on non-
HIPAA–eligible enrollees. Some impose a cap on total enrollment. All
pools operate at a loss since claims paid are higher than premiums
collected. To cover these losses, most states impose assessments on
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insurers participating in the individual market. Some states finance their
pools though more broad-based measures, such as surcharges on other
health insurance premiums, excise taxes, or state general revenues.31
Renewed interest exists in Congress to provide funding to states to
either establish high-risk pools or help finance them. Such assistance has
been included in H.R. 3009, recently signed into law by the president as
the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L.107-210). Up to $1 million will be available to
each eligible state to establish a new high-risk pool. States with existing
qualified risk pools will be able to get federal matching funds to help
finance their operation.32
Public Program Buy-Ins
Instead of, or in addition to, private insurance, tax credits could be de-
signed to subsidize public insurance coverage, such as Medicaid, SCHIP,
or a publicly sponsored insurance program. Al Gore proposed the use of
tax credits to help low-income families buy into Medicaid or SCHIP dur-
ing his presidential campaign. Under Bush’s proposal, credit-eligible in-
dividuals could buy coverage through Medicaid or SCHIP managed care
plans in states where these programs contract with such plans; if there are
no Medicaid or SCHIP managed care plans, states would be allowed to
open up state public employee plans to tax credit recipients. The House
and Senate Democratic alternative to Republican economic stimulus pack-
ages would have provided tax credits or other forms of public subsidy to
help qualified dislocated workers who are not eligible for COBRA health
insurance continuation coverage or cannot afford it to buy into Medicaid
on a temporary basis.33 Some Democrats have supported the use of tax
credits for pre-Medicare retirees to buy into Medicare.34
All of these “buy-in” proposals face similar design issues: Perhaps the
most important is minimizing the effects of adverse selection on both the
enrollees in the plan being bought into and the tax-credit-eligible enroll-
ees. Selection is influenced by participation rules, the enrollment process,
benefit design, and perhaps most of all, by premiums. Should the cover-
age offered to tax-credit-eligible individuals be the same as or different
from the coverage offered by the public program? How should the pre-
mium for the coverage be determined? For example, should the premium
charged to these individuals reflect the cost of the broader pool of insureds
(for example, all Medicaid or Medicare beneficiaries) or just the pool of
tax credit recipients? Who would administer the program for this new
pool of insured? Should measures be taken to protect the private carriers
from losing business to the public program buy-in option?
Proposals that would give individuals tax credits to purchase Medicaid
or SCHIP also raise questions about substitution of federal dollars for
state dollars. As suggested earlier, states could be required to maintain
their current level of Medicaid spending, as has been done with respect
to other policy changes. For example, when SCHIP was enacted, states
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were prohibited from substituting the newly available SCHIP dollars
for their existing Medicaid commitments.35
SUBSTITUTION
As noted earlier, some of the “tax expenditure” for a new health insur-
ance credit would go to subsidize people who already have coverage.
To reduce this “substitution” effect, some proposals would make a credit
available only to people who have been without insurance for some
period. However, a rule of this kind would be difficult to enforce and,
again, raises equity questions. Why should a new buyer receive a sub-
sidy while people at the same income level who have been paying for
coverage all along receive no subsidy? Most proposals, then, allow ex-
isting buyers of nongroup coverage to claim the credit. There has been
much more concern about the potential effects of a credit on the em-
ployer market.
One reason that most nonelderly people obtain health insurance through
the workplace is that tax subsidies are available for employer coverage
but usually not for individually purchased coverage. An individual health
insurance tax credit would not just reduce the relative advantage of em-
ployer coverage; for some people, it could make nongroup coverage more
attractive. In 2001, the average worker with employee-only coverage was
contributing $360 a year toward the cost of his or her premiums.36 If work-
ers eligible for, say, a $1,000 credit could find a nongroup plan for less
than $1,360, they might be better off dropping the employer coverage. An
employer that had many such workers might do better to offer higher
wages or other benefits instead of health insurance.
How likely is this scenario? Probably it depends on the size of the credit
and whether the credit is available to the middle- and higher-income
families who are currently more likely to have employer coverage. Re-
cent attempts to model the effects of various credit proposals have pro-
jected modest immediate reductions in employer coverage—drops in
the range of 1 to 4 percent.37
Some proposals would seek to preclude coverage-shifting by making
people who are offered employer coverage ineligible for an individual
credit. (A similar rule currently applies to the health insurance deduction
for the self-employed.) Again, a rule of this kind is hard to enforce through
the tax code, and would, in any event, not address the long-range incen-
tives for workers to shift to jobs with higher wages and no health plan.
Another option would be to allow the credit to be used for the employee’s
share of group premiums. This would remove the incentive for cover-
age-shifting and would also encourage take-up of coverage by lower-
income workers who are currently not participating in their employers’
plans. However, it could also mean that a very large share of the new
expenditure would go to currently insured people.
An individual health
insurance tax credit
would not just re-
duce the relative ad-
vantage of employer
coverage; for some
people, it could make
nongroup coverage
more attractive.
21
NHPF Background Paper August 28, 2002
Finally, some proposals would completely equalize the tax treatment of
individual and employer coverage. For example, an income-based credit
might be used for coverage in either setting, while employer contribu-
tions would be taxable income for employees. Proponents of this ap-
proach point out that the current exclusion of employer contributions
favors workers in the higher-income tax brackets because the exclusion
or deduction reduces their tax bill by more. Moreover, the current sys-
tem locks most people into plans selected by their employers, when
workers might prefer to choose their own benefits or delivery system.
Opponents of equalized treatment contend that it would destabilize the
employer market and potentially increase the number of uninsured
people. For example, it could be that younger and healthier workers
would be more likely to shift to the nongroup market because they
could find better prices. Higher-risk workers would be left behind in a
steadily deteriorating risk pool. As prices rose, employers would face
greater incentives to drop coverage or shift the costs to workers.
ADMINISTRATION OF TAX CREDITS
There are certain administrative issues associated with implementation
that accompany any new federal policy to expand health insurance cov-
erage, and how these issues are addressed can have significant implica-
tions for how many people take advantage of the new subsidies. The
more complex the system, the longer it will take and more difficult it
will be to obtain significant participation rates among the targeted popu-
lations. In addition, participation will depend on the degree of effort
invested in educating the public on the new program in terms of who is
eligible, what the mechanics are for receiving the subsidies, and what
types of coverage the subsidies may be used for.
Administration of a tax credit subsidy for health insurance requires deter-
mination of individuals’ eligibility status and some mechanism to make
the subsidy dollars available to those eligible for the purchase of the cov-
erage. If advance funding is provided, there may or may not also be the
need to have a reconciliation process whereby actual income is compared
to estimated income to determine if an adjustment in the subsidy amount
is necessary (either recoupment of excess subsidy funds or provision of
additional subsidy funds in cases where income was overestimated).
The most direct way to provide tax credits is simply to use the existing
tax filing system. There would be no need to determine eligibility in
advance. Individuals would self-determine their eligibility status based
on their expected income for the year, and any other criteria relevant to
the policy on credits (for example, unemployment status and lack of
access to employer coverage). Eligible individuals would receive the
applicable amount of reimbursement for their health insurance expenses
by claiming the credit when filing their tax returns for the previous
year. Individuals who wished some advancement of the credit could
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adjust their tax withholding to provide additional net income. Recon-
ciliation would be unnecessary since the individual’s exact income and
eligibility status would be known at the time the claim for the credit
was made. However, such an approach has drawbacks, because indi-
viduals who would most likely be eligible under any health insurance
tax credit approach will have relatively low incomes. In addition to not
having much discretionary income to pay premiums, they may not be
knowledgeable or comfortable enough with the tax system to under-
stand the consequences or mechanics of withholding.38 And they may
not understand how tax credits work, that, for example, they may be
available to individuals who do not itemize their returns or that credits
are refundable to the extent they exceed total tax liability.
Differing methods for determining probable eligibility and advancing
credits are contained in the various tax credit proposals. Often, govern-
ment agencies that are familiar with qualifying individuals for govern-
ment programs based on income are used. The exact method proposed
often corresponds directly to the characteristics of the target population.
For example, proposals to extend tax credits to unemployed or displaced
workers may call for the state unemployment offices to perform this func-
tion. Other proposals assign this function to state Medicaid programs,
especially those proposals that would allow the credit to be used to buy
into coverage under state Medicaid or SCHIP programs. One large draw-
back of using such existing government agencies is the stigma that is at-
tached to government assistance. Many low-income working individuals
may be discouraged from taking advantage of the credits if they must
interact with government “welfare” agencies. Indeed, reducing the barri-
ers imposed by the welfare stigma is one reason many states have opted
to implement SCHIP programs separate from Medicaid.39
There are also various proposals for how the transfer of subsidy funds
would be made for payment of the health insurance premiums. Few
proposals would advance cash to the individual to use for premium
payments. Instead, individuals, once qualified to receive an advance
credit, would receive some form of certification that could be used like
a voucher to present to the insurer. The insurer would then be paid the
subsidy amount on behalf of the individual. The insurer might directly
receive payment from the Department of the Treasury, or some other
mechanism to provide the funds may be specified. For example, in some
proposals, the insurer may deduct the relevant sums from its payroll tax
payment obligations. Many proposals simply leave the issue of how
vouchers for advance payment would work up to the secretary of health
and human services to define through regulations. However payments
are made, insurers, or employers in the case of COBRA premiums, are
concerned that they be timely; they do not want to have to float the
subsidy amounts while waiting for payment by the government.
Making advance payments based on assumptions about income eligibil-
ity raises issues of reconciliation after the fact. Individuals who qualify
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for advancement of the credits may have changes in circumstances that
change their eligibility status. In such cases, the government may be
making advance payments to ineligible individuals and some process
for recoupment is necessary. Or, if the credits are graduated based on
income, some individuals may, in fact, have less income than they antici-
pated and therefore qualify for larger subsidy payments than they ob-
tained on an advance basis.
Some people think the amounts involved are trivial, especially if eligibil-
ity is determined in advance using the prior year’s tax return, and that
having any kind of reconciliation will scare off potential participants. One
way to deal with this problem is simply to establish time-limited eligibil-
ity based on information available at the time and not provide for recon-
ciliation after the fact. This approach would require that eligibility be
reviewed on a more frequent basis and thus poses an administrative bur-
den. Other proposals provide for reconciliation through the annual tax
filing process. However, especially in the case of low-income individuals,
individuals may not have realized that their eligibility changed or termi-
nated mid-year and that they are now liable to refund some or all of the
advanced subsidies. They may not have available resources to do this.
Providing adequate information and communication about any new fed-
eral policy to encourage health insurance coverage is essential to achiev-
ing significant participation. This may be even more true of tax policy,
which can be arcane and confusing. Higher-risk individuals who have
had difficulty obtaining affordable coverage in the existing market might
find their way to the program on their own. Attracting a sufficient mix
of lower-risk people to permit real pooling might require an informa-
tion campaign that not only highlights the mechanics of the program but
also persuades people of the importance of being insured.
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